ECOWAS and Senegal Senegal is an active member in the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and participates in ECOWAS’s Standby Force (ESF) regional brigade, one of five brigades that make up the AU Standby Force, an international African military capability. Senegal’s capital of Dakar serves as a logistics and supply base for the ESF.[i] In October 2010, Senegal participated in an operationalization exercise called “Amani Africa” for all AU Standby Forces.[ii]
Indeed, if history has any lessons here, it is that certain developmental processes must precede democratisation, and recent comparisons between liberalization in Russia and China may bear this out...There is a danger in US assumptions that democratic states are likely to be stable and pro-West, and little evidence to prove that they manage their economies better than authoritarian regimes...In short, the argument that democracy should be encouraged in Africa as a means to securing political stability and economic prosperity is ungrounded and based on numerous false assumptions.(pp. 202-03)
DC: Moss further notes that as long ago as 1967, British economist Barrington Moore credibly argued in his book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, that "certain historical processes need to develop, notably the emergence of a large middle-class, in order to sustain a viable democratic state." (p.204)
DC: Moss adds that George Kennan noted in Nichols and Loescher's 1989 book, The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy Today that "'Democracy has a relatively narrow base both in time and space; and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for people outside those narrow perimeters." (p.204)
Moss also quotes former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, from Peter Schraeder's 1994 book, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change, as saying, "US hypocrisy is often at its most blatant when 'pushing American values' in the same breath as 'respecting other cultures'."(p.204)
From 1962 to 1988 the leading African recipients of American aid were Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire. This list hardly implies a positive
correlation between aid and democratization, but rather suggests that American involvement was actually an impediment to that process.(p.204)
There seems to be a refusal by the West to acknowledge that 'civil society' may exist in a form that is not necessarily either 'modern' or 'liberal'. Far too often Americans emphasise that the growth of western plural units should be promoted without realising that a vibrant 'civil society' already exists in a number of African states, albeit often based on other relationships or identities, notably family, clan, and ethnicity...Despite the facade of the African state, alternative power structures continue to exist, and their legitimacy is rarely based on 'democracy'...But what if the society has a single assembly with appointed chiefs? Would that fit the prescribed conditions for democracy? The fundamental point is that competitive elections may not be a necessary component in establishing political legitimacy.(pp.205-06)
When confronted with the local and not-necessarily democratic nature of political authority in Africa, the US Government is not geared to deal well with such structures. Its inability to come to terms with Somali clans and the absurd assignment of the military to 'nationbuilding' are recent examples. (p.206-07)
Efforts at exporting western institutions and values are likely to fail, at least in the short to medium term. Predictions that elected regimes will be stable and pro-America are ungrounded. Assumptions of the universal nature of liberalism and democratic political systems are clearly false. It is arrogant to believe that there is only one way of organising a society, and presumptuous to think that the US Government is capable of engineering a series of external transformations, not least because the nature and source of political legitimacy in Africa has been misunderstood...Hence the crucial need for American policy-makers to recognise important weaknesses in their approach, which ought to be based on a more comprehensive understanding of African realities.(pp. 208-09)
African Regional and Subregional Organizations: Assessing Their Contributions to Economic Integration and Conflict Management. (2008, October). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Erastus Mwencha, COMESA’S outgoing Secretary-General, noted that efforts to develop regional infrastructure projects, which are especially critical for landlocked states and are often beyond national capacities, have been hampered by investor concerns about the financial viability of regional economic communities. Hence, it becomes essential for RECs to develop transparent and stable regional frameworks in order to attract greater investments. In recent years they have registered some successes in this sphere, particularly in promoting regional energy cooperation. They have also made inroads in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.
A second area requiring greater regional cooperation, according to Mwencha, is peace and security. The circumstances in which most African states gained their independence—lacking institutional capacities and sustainable borders, and standing at the crossroads between East and West during the Cold War—have left
their mark on the present state of affairs on the continent. Since the 1960s, nearly all African states have experienced intra-state or inter-state conflict. The arbitrary and porous nature of national borders has occasioned the spilling-over of many intra-state rebellions into neighboring states, as has been the case in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa. These unique characteristics make regional approaches particularly suitable for mitigating conflict in Africa.
Since the inception of the African Union in 2002, Africa has witnessed a dramatic reduction in the number of armed conflicts. The AU is now equipped with diplomatic prevention mechanisms, such as the Panel of Wise Men, and standing units that can be deployed quickly in order to terminate ongoing conflicts (the African Standby Force). These have played an important role in Côte d’Ivoire as well as in Sudan.
Mwencha proposed that to properly address and mend these problems, the African Union and the RECs should work together with the international community to
establish unambiguous response mechanisms and areas of responsibility. African organizations possess the knowledge and human capacity necessary to lead effective response efforts, but they lack certain material and logistical resources that can be provided by international bodies.
Former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark argued that a regional approach to conflict management is superior to both international involvement and bilateral negotiations. Regional organizations are well positioned to detect early warning signs of a looming conflict. They enjoy greater popular legitimacy in conflict zones than international mediators and peacekeepers,
and have the local knowledge needed to carry out nuanced and constructive conflict resolution policies. At the same time, they possess the experience, structure, and balance often lacking in bilateral negotiations.
Yet, in Clark’s view, the principal obstacles facing African regional organizations as they attempt to improve their conflict mitigation capacities stem from the donor community. These shortcomings include: problems with coordination among donors; delays in the realization of donor monetary commitments; well-intentioned but onerous accountability requirements imposed by donors on African organizations; and statutory and bureaucratic constraints on security-related assistance in many western countries. Financial and bureaucratic weaknesses on the part of the donor community can and does impede swift and timely action. Beyond the need to attend to these specific problems, Clark advocated a broader attitudinal change among western nations, one requiring a deeper commitment to and long-term engagement with Africa. Without such a transformation, he cautioned, African security, as well as economic growth, will be much harder to achieve.
Franklin Moore, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) pointed out that the African Union—in contrast to
its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU)—contains in its charter and structure an inherent proclivity toward regional approaches. While the AU creates political space for African states to intervene in the affairs of their peers, it prohibits any one member country from taking such measures unilaterally, thus limiting the utility of bilateral engagements. Nevertheless, Moore pointed out that most regional organizations in Africa were designed first and foremost as mechanisms to advance economic growth and development rather than security and peace. Furthermore, they are better equipped to deal with inter-state conflicts than intra-state conflict, though the latter are far more common in Africa. Notwithstanding, in recent years African regional and sub-regional organizations have assumed greater security responsibilities, with some notable successes in Liberia, southern Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Moore emphasized the importance of donor assistance to regional capacity-building efforts in the area of conflict mitigation. Regional organizations must become more efficient and refine their ability to utilize the full range of conflict management tools at their disposal. He maintained that increasing regional capacity would itself play a constructive role in conflict reduction, as the benefits of membership and sense of allegiance would create additional incentives for states to resolve regional conflicts diplomatically, using the pen rather than the sword.
Mahamane Touré, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security noted that ECOWAS members created a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to serve as an intervention and peacekeeping force in West Africa, and in December passed the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. Interventions were carried out in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997, and the hard-learned lessons from these engagements were used to improve ECOMOG’s security-related capacities.
ECOWAS has also taken steps to use regional economic integration as means for conflict mitigation. These include facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and vehicles throughout the region by abolishing visa requirements; supporting infrastructural projects to develop regional roads and gas pipelines, homogenizing regional economic policy; and establishing a regional investment bank.
Discussion on the recent introduction of ECOWARN (ECOWAS’s Early Warning and Response Network), under which, ECOWAS has designated two points of contact in each member state: one within member governments and the other from the ranks of civil society groups. They are tasked with filling out and submitting daily reports on dozens of security indicators to ECOWAS’s headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. The data is then synthesized with open source information to create a more comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground and allow regional decision-makers to avert rapid deterioration within member states.
AU and Subregional Organizations
LOOK AT JANES FOR AU FORCE INFORMATIONThe RECs include:
The African Union Peace and Security Council:A Five-Year Appraisal, 2010: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Monograph187Addis.pdf
Cilliers, J., 2008, 'The African Standby Force - An update on progress', ISS Paper 160, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa
ECOWAS and Senegal
Senegal is an active member in the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) and participates in ECOWAS’s Standby Force (ESF) regional brigade, one of five brigades that make up the AU Standby Force, an international African military capability. Senegal’s capital of Dakar serves as a logistics and supply base for the ESF.[i] In October 2010, Senegal participated in an operationalization exercise called “Amani Africa” for all AU Standby Forces.[ii]
[i] “Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments: Senegal” Accessed through www.janes.com 20 January 2012 “Dakar will be re-oriented as a forward logistics and supply base in support of the ESF. Peacekeeping and humanitarian equipment will be stockpiled at the base for rapid deployment via French aircraft and ships across the region.”
[ii]http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/news/amani-africa-%E2%80%9Cpromote-and-protect-peace-and-security-africa%E2%80%9D (Reliability: 47.94, Very High. Accessed 22 January 2012).
Moss, Todd J. (1995) US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: The Limits of Liberal Universalism
Indeed, if history has any lessons here, it is that certain developmental processes must precede democratisation, and recent comparisons between liberalization in Russia and China may bear this out...There is a danger in US assumptions that democratic states are likely to be stable and pro-West, and little evidence to prove that they manage their economies better than authoritarian regimes...In short, the argument that democracy should be encouraged in Africa as a means to securing
political stability and economic prosperity is ungrounded and based on numerous false assumptions.(pp. 202-03)
DC: Moss further notes that as long ago as 1967, British economist Barrington Moore credibly argued in his book, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World, that "certain historical processes need to develop, notably the emergence of a large middle-class, in order to sustain a viable democratic state." (p.204)
DC: Moss adds that George Kennan noted in Nichols and Loescher's 1989 book, The Moral Nation: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy Today that "'Democracy has a relatively narrow base both in time and space; and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for people outside those narrow perimeters."
(p.204)
Moss also quotes former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, from Peter Schraeder's 1994 book, United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change, as saying, "US hypocrisy is often at its most blatant when 'pushing American values' in the same breath as 'respecting other cultures'."(p.204)
From 1962 to 1988 the leading African recipients of American aid were Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire. This list hardly implies a positive
correlation between aid and democratization, but rather suggests that American involvement was actually an impediment to that process.(p.204)
There seems to be a refusal by the West to acknowledge that 'civil society' may exist in a form that is not necessarily either 'modern' or 'liberal'. Far too often Americans emphasise that the growth of western plural units should be promoted without realising that a vibrant 'civil society' already exists in a number of African states, albeit often based on other relationships or identities, notably family, clan, and ethnicity...Despite the facade of the African state, alternative power structures continue to exist, and their legitimacy is rarely based on 'democracy'...But what if the society has a single assembly with appointed chiefs? Would that fit the prescribed conditions for democracy? The fundamental point is that competitive elections may not be a necessary component in establishing political legitimacy.(pp.205-06)
When confronted with the local and not-necessarily democratic nature of political authority in Africa, the US Government is not geared to deal well with such structures. Its inability to come to terms with Somali clans and the absurd assignment of the military to 'nationbuilding' are recent examples. (p.206-07)
Efforts at exporting western institutions and values are likely to fail, at least in the short to medium term. Predictions that elected regimes will be stable and pro-America are ungrounded. Assumptions of the universal nature of liberalism and democratic political systems are clearly false. It is arrogant to believe that there is only one way of organising a society, and presumptuous to think that the US Government is capable of engineering a series of external transformations, not least because the nature and source of political legitimacy in Africa has been misunderstood...Hence the crucial need for American policy-makers to recognise important weaknesses in their approach, which ought to be based on a more comprehensive understanding of African realities.(pp. 208-09)
Brookings' Foresight Africa 2012
African Regional and Subregional Organizations: Assessing Their Contributions to Economic Integration and Conflict Management. (2008, October). Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Erastus Mwencha, COMESA’S outgoing Secretary-General, noted that efforts to develop regional infrastructure projects, which are especially critical for landlocked states and are often beyond national capacities, have been hampered by investor concerns about the financial viability of regional economic communities. Hence, it becomes essential for RECs to develop transparent and stable regional frameworks in order to attract greater investments. In recent years they have registered some successes in this sphere, particularly in promoting regional energy cooperation. They have also made inroads in the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade.
A second area requiring greater regional cooperation, according to Mwencha, is peace and security. The circumstances in which most African states gained their independence—lacking institutional capacities and sustainable borders, and standing at the crossroads between East and West during the Cold War—have left
their mark on the present state of affairs on the continent. Since the 1960s, nearly all African states have experienced intra-state or inter-state conflict. The arbitrary and porous nature of national borders has occasioned the spilling-over of many intra-state rebellions into neighboring states, as has been the case in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa. These unique characteristics make regional approaches particularly suitable for mitigating conflict in Africa.
Since the inception of the African Union in 2002, Africa has witnessed a dramatic reduction in the number of armed conflicts. The AU is now equipped with diplomatic prevention mechanisms, such as the Panel of Wise Men, and standing units that can be deployed quickly in order to terminate ongoing conflicts (the African Standby Force). These have played an important role in Côte d’Ivoire as well as in Sudan.
Mwencha proposed that to properly address and mend these problems, the African Union and the RECs should work together with the international community to
establish unambiguous response mechanisms and areas of responsibility. African organizations possess the knowledge and human capacity necessary to lead effective response efforts, but they lack certain material and logistical resources that can be provided by international bodies.
Former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark argued that a regional approach to conflict management is superior to both international involvement and bilateral negotiations. Regional organizations are well positioned to detect early warning signs of a looming conflict. They enjoy greater popular legitimacy in conflict zones than international mediators and peacekeepers,
and have the local knowledge needed to carry out nuanced and constructive conflict resolution policies. At the same time, they possess the experience, structure, and balance often lacking in bilateral negotiations.
Yet, in Clark’s view, the principal obstacles facing African regional organizations as they attempt to improve their conflict mitigation capacities stem from the donor community. These shortcomings include: problems with coordination among donors; delays in the realization of donor monetary commitments; well-intentioned but onerous accountability requirements imposed by donors on African organizations; and statutory and bureaucratic constraints on security-related assistance in many western countries. Financial and bureaucratic weaknesses on the part of the donor community can and does impede swift and timely action. Beyond the need to attend to these specific problems, Clark advocated a broader attitudinal change among western nations, one requiring a deeper commitment to and long-term engagement with Africa. Without such a transformation, he cautioned, African security, as well as economic growth, will be much harder to achieve.
Franklin Moore, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) pointed out that the African Union—in contrast to
its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity (OAU)—contains in its charter and structure an inherent proclivity toward regional approaches. While the AU creates political space for African states to intervene in the affairs of their peers, it prohibits any one member country from taking such measures unilaterally, thus limiting the utility of bilateral engagements. Nevertheless, Moore pointed out that most regional organizations in Africa were designed first and foremost as mechanisms to advance economic growth and development rather than security and peace. Furthermore, they are better equipped to deal with inter-state conflicts than intra-state conflict, though the latter are far more common in Africa. Notwithstanding, in recent years African regional and sub-regional organizations have assumed greater security responsibilities, with some notable successes in Liberia, southern Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Moore emphasized the importance of donor assistance to regional capacity-building efforts in the area of conflict mitigation. Regional organizations must become more efficient and refine their ability to utilize the full range of conflict management tools at their disposal. He maintained that increasing regional capacity would itself play a constructive role in conflict reduction, as the benefits of membership and sense of allegiance would create additional incentives for states to resolve regional conflicts diplomatically, using the pen rather than the sword.
Mahamane Touré, ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security noted that ECOWAS members created a Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to serve as an intervention and peacekeeping force in West Africa, and in December passed the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security. Interventions were carried out in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997, and the hard-learned lessons from these engagements were used to improve ECOMOG’s security-related capacities.
ECOWAS has also taken steps to use regional economic integration as means for conflict mitigation. These include facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and vehicles throughout the region by abolishing visa requirements; supporting infrastructural projects to develop regional roads and gas pipelines, homogenizing regional economic policy; and establishing a regional investment bank.
Discussion on the recent introduction of ECOWARN (ECOWAS’s Early Warning and Response Network), under which, ECOWAS has designated two points of contact in each member state: one within member governments and the other from the ranks of civil society groups. They are tasked with filling out and submitting daily reports on dozens of security indicators to ECOWAS’s headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. The data is then synthesized with open source information to create a more comprehensive picture of the situation on the ground and allow regional decision-makers to avert rapid deterioration within member states.
FULL TEXT OF SPEECHES ALSO INCLUDED